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The Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) was created to identify and 
respond to emerging threats to the stability of the United States financial system.  The 
research arm of the FSOC, the Office of Financial Research (OFR), has begun to 
explore agent-based models (ABMs) for measuring the emergent threat of systemic 
risk. We propose an ABM-based regulatory structure that incentivizes the honest 
participation and data contribution of regulated firms while providing clarity into the 
actions of the firms as endogenous to the market and driving emergent behavior. We 
build this scheme onto an existing ABM of a single-asset market to examine whether 
the structure of the scheme could provide its own benefits to market stabilization.  We 
find that without regulatory intervention, markets acting within this proposed 
  
structure experience fewer bankruptcies and lower leverage buildup while returning 
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Chapter 1: Motivation & Proposal 
 
Five years after “the [financial] system broke down” and “repercussions of 
[Lehman’s] collapse … reverberated across our economy” (Rep. Waxman, 2008), 
systemic risk remains unregulated and unmeasured. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd Frank Act), intended to address that risk, 
was passed in 2010 yet is less than halfway finalized.  Perhaps fueled by the failures 
of other post-crisis efforts to calm the markets, one of the fundamental pieces of 
legislation that developed the momentum to pass was the very first section of the 
Dodd Frank Act in Title I: the establishment of the Financial Stability Oversight 
Council (FSOC) and the Office of Financial Research (OFR). 
 The OFR is created as a research group to support the FSOC by providing it 
with the depth of knowledge necessary to perform a rigorous task.   
 
The FSOC has three broad mandates: (1) to identify risks to financial 
stability arising from events or activities of large financial firms or 
elsewhere; (2) to promote market discipline by eliminating 
participants’ expectations of possible government bailouts; and (3) to 
respond to emerging threats to the stability of the financial system. 
(Bisias, Flood, Lo, & Valavanis, 2012) 
 
 
The FSOC was not tasked with a limited mission to address one facet of a financial 
meltdown such as providing liquidity1 to a market, balancing inflation, or managing 
the employment rate.  Its task is to regulate systemic risk more extensively. 
 
                                                




 “Before we can hope to manage the risks of financial crises effectively, we 
must be able to define and measure those risks explicitly” (Lo 2008).  This task is 
comprehensive and challenging.  We classify two groups of complicating factors to 
the measurement of systemic risk, both of which stem from its general definition: 
“Systemic risk refers to the risk of collapse of an entire complex system as a result of 
the actions taken by the individual component entities or agents that comprise the 
system.”(Chen, Iyengar, & Moallemi, 2013)  First, systemic risk is as multi-faceted 
and highly dynamic as the complex system that it threatens. This is a complication of 
the theoretical mechanics of measurement.  Second, the individual entities intrinsic to 
the system and collectively generating the risk have the richest and most detailed 
individual data on themselves, but no incentive to pool that data for the measurement 
of systemic risk.  This presents a complication of the inputs to measurement.  We 
propose a regulatory structure designed to overcome these specific challenges of 
multi-dimensional dynamic measurement and individual incentive restricting 
available inputs.  
We propose a cooperative structure between the FSOC and the participants of 
the financial system it is designed to oversee using an agent-based model (ABM).  
Below, we detail the nature of the two factors complicating the measurement of 
systemic risk and how an ABM in use in a contributory structure would address those 
issues.  We argue that this structure would have the flexibility, precision, and depth of 
data to support the FSOC’s mandate to measure and manage systemic risk.  We 
further detail an intriguing potential consequence of the proposed structure.  It is then 




in the mitigation of some of those market threats that the proposed structure is 
designed to help monitor. 
 
 The first challenge to the theoretical mechanics of systemic risk measurement 
is its multi-dimensional aspect.  Although there has been a large increase in the 
volume of research on systemic risk, this research has not been straightforward, 
cohesive, or even easily catalogued. To what breadth and depth of detail systemic risk 
should be measured is not clear.  In the first working paper of the OFR (Bisias et al., 
2012), the authors collected 31 academic models on systemic risk, each covering a 
different facet of financial stability.  Still, the authors cautioned that they were not 
providing an exhaustive survey.   
 
While each of the approaches surveyed in this paper is meant to 
capture a specific challenge to financial stability, we remain agnostic 
about what is knowable.  The system to be measured is highly 
complex, and so far, no systemic risk measure has been tested “out of 
sample”, i.e., outside the recent crisis.  Indeed, some of the conceptual 
frame-works that we review are still in their infancy and have yet to be 
applied.  Moreover, even if an exhaustive overview of the systemic 
risk literature were possible, it would likely be out of date as soon as it 
was written. 
(Bisias et al., 2012) 
 
 
While each model offered a view on systemic risk, none of them completely 
incorporated any of the others or was itself a complete model of the risks involved.  
Even a catalogue of the models did not prove definitive, as the authors offered 
different taxonomies based on data requirement, supervisory scope, event or decision 





 The second difficulty in the theory of systemic risk measurement is its 
dynamic nature. New instruments for financial flexibility and access are constantly 
being invented, altered, and refined.  In the drive for profit and productivity, the 
envelope is continually pushed and occasionally reshaped: free checking, mortgage-
backed securities, over-the-counter derivatives and credit-default swaps are all 
financial innovations. The risk is as shifting as the system to which it is intrinsically 
linked. 
We propose the use of a tool as dynamic and multi-faceted as the systemic 
risk we need to define and measure: an agent-based model.  As noted in the OFR’s 
third working paper, most models do not address multiple dimensions and do not 
allow for emergent effects:  
 
[A]bsent a model that can chart the course of events during financial 
disruptions, it is difficult to assess the value of these measures, 
especially given the many changes in the financial landscape that 
occur over time which lead to new vulnerabilities and paths through 
which shocks can propagate across the system.  And existing models 
of the financial system are partial equilibrium models that are not built 
for this task. These models are designed to rebound back from shocks 
and return to the equilibrium state rather than running off the rails. 
 
To make up for these weaknesses, a model of the financial system 
needs to be flexible, in order to provide results without extensive 
historical data either for parameterization or for testing, and in order to 
describe markets that fall into disarray. 
(Bookstaber, 2012)  
 
 
An ABM is one way to provide for the multi-dimensional and dynamic aspects of 






In agent-based modeling (ABM), a system is modeled as a collection 
of autonomous decision-making entities called agents.  Each agent 
individually assesses its situation and makes decisions on the basis of a 
set of rules.  Agents may execute various behaviors appropriate for the 
system they represent – for example, producing, consuming, or selling.  
Repetitive competitive interactions between agents are a feature of 
agent-based modeling, which relies on the power of computers to 
explore the dynamics out of the reach of pure mathematical methods. 
At the simplest level, an agent-based model consists of a system of 
agents and the relationships between them.  Even a simple agent-based 
model can exhibit complex behavior patterns and provide valuable 
information about the dynamics of the real-world system that it 
emulates.  In addition, agents may be capable of evolving allowing 




 As an ABM is executed, a record or calculation could be made from any of its 
multiple variables, allowing it to report on multiple dimensions.  This output would 
enable the examination of correlations between several different aspects of systemic 
risk and perhaps allow for the development of a single risk metric from any portion of 
the broad time series of data.  Reporting on multiple variables allows the ABM to be 
multi-faceted, and reporting on those variables across the time steps of the simulation 
would capture dynamic shifts in the model.  An ABM of the market could track 
different parameters of the regulated bodies and allow those parameters to be updated 
by the modelers as circumstances change.  Further, the model could be written to be 
responsive to changes in input or even recoded to adapt to changes in the political 
landscape or in the world of financial innovation.  Such a dynamic and responsive 
model would keep regulators up to date and allow them to use flexible and process-
based regulations.  The repeatability of the outcomes of an ABM given the same 
inputs makes it a valuable tool for transparent counterfactuals, sensitivity analyses, 




non-linear cases also makes ABMs valuable during the fast-paced and shifting 
environment of a crisis as it unfolds. 
The second complication facing the measurement of systemic risk, the 
complication of the inputs to measurement, is less a matter of theoretical mechanics 
and more a matter of implementation.  The incentive of the “individual component 
entities or agents that comprise the system” (Chen et al., 2013) has not been properly 
directed towards the measurement of systemic risk, ultimately limiting the available 
input data.  The individual market participants would each like to measure and 
account for all of their risks.  Yet due to their competitiveness as self-interested 
individuals, they do not have the collective incentive required to share their deep and 
narrow market data to create a collaborative set.  Such collaboration would be 
required to provide the breadth and depth of data necessary for accuracy in a complex 
ABM of the market’s systemic risk.  Our proposal guides individual incentive 
towards that collaboration by overcoming the roadblocks currently faced at an 
individual level.  Despite a desire to minimize exposure to risk, individuals also face 
privacy concerns and competitive deterrents from working towards the public good of 
a stable marketplace. 
The motivation of individual market participants to account for all possible 
risks is observed in their post-crisis behavior. Lehman Brothers would have had an 
interest in how its actions were impacting its risk profile long before it collapsed.  
Had the company known how to appropriately hedge or avoid those risks that 
bankrupted it or even had a better way to manage events as they unfolded, the course 




collapsed or bought out of the marketplace, the market participants have not 
demonstrably measured how they might be impacted by the risk of the system.   That 
is, while the incentive is there, subsequent developments have not materialized.  
Instead, market participants have exhibited an attempt to control their exposure to 
systemic risk by taking what independent action they can in severely restricting other 
aspects of their individual risk profiles.   
The need for data privacy and security by financial market participants is the 
clearest roadblock to data collaboration. In a fast-paced world of financial innovation, 
trade secrecy is an important protection.  One firm cannot obtain proprietary data 
from any other, nor will it divulge its own market positions, profiles, or networked 
relationships to its competitors.  A complete model of systemic risk would have to 
rely on data from the whole system, but broad coverage of proprietary market data is 
not something to which any single market participant has access.  Individual 
participants and researchers do not have access to sufficiently granular data to 
incorporate the details of the market into a model of risk.  
 In addition to privacy and secrecy challenges, there is a game-theoretic 
roadblock to an individual market participant’s incentive to define and measure 
systemic risk.  As a public good, security from systemic risk is not something any one 
individual can benefit from promoting for its own sake.  The efforts of any one firm 
cannot bring it about, and in the meantime those same efforts may make the firm less 
profitable and drive it from the marketplace.  
Government, on the other hand, is best suited to deliver public goods not 




the creation of the FSOC and OFR, like the Federal Reserve, Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation, and other government-sponsored enterprises before them, 
were attempts to fill this role.  The market as a whole and the individuals and 
governments impacted by it have the incentive and can together develop the means to 
measure systemic risk even though the individual market participants may not be 
sufficiently incentivized or able.  This can take the form of the means to write and 
enforce rules designed to pull proprietary data from market participants to force their 
participation in the government’s enactment of the public good, but this merely poses 
another negative externality onto the market.  Our proposal is designed to take 
advantage of the strength of government as an impartial partner who can provide 
privacy protection and explicit incentive to participate in the regulatory structure.  
Rather than treat the government as a mere tool for enforcement, we see the 
opportunity for ubiquitous market engagement that can be used to help shift the 
incentive of individual firms. 
To address the issue of harnessing private incentive to gain access to 
proprietary data delivered in good faith, we propose a contributory model hosted by 
the government.  An example of this mutually beneficial data sharing exists already in 
the private sector.  With privacy protections in place, individual firms deliver their 
data to a corporate data collector, creating a large market database.  The collector uses 
that database for modeling and profit-seeking enterprises. Though the data providers 
cannot access the collective proprietary data of the market to build their own models, 
the data collector pays for the supplied data with access to its own models and that 




The regulated market participants are the data providers while the OFR and 
FSOC act in the position of data collector and model distributor in our proposed 
cooperative regulatory structure.  The model made possible by this collection of 
contributed proprietary data is the ABM of the market that measures systemic risk. 
Following the incentive structure in the private sector, the FSOC and OFR could 
incentivize accurate and timely data delivery from contributing market participants by 
offering model access and systemic risk analysis generated from the ABM. With 
access to the ABM of systemic risk, participants could query the model in advance of 
a particular set of actions to estimate the impact of their choices on their own risk 
profiles.  As in the private sector arrangement, a private party wishing to design such 
a model for its own use would not have access to all of the data provided into the 
contributory model. Therefore, the firms’ best approach would be to honestly 
participate in the delivery of data to the regulator and make decisions based on the 
results of the model generated by the FSOC. 
For this model generation, the FSOC should invite market participants to 
engage in companion modeling to ensure that the model provides sufficient 
information to the regulators and the regulated without providing too much 
information to market competitors. Each participant would be incentivized to provide 
a substantial amount of institutional insight and manpower to the model creation 
process if they believed they would benefit from a more valid model.  The impact of 
each institution looking to promote its own benefit would in some way balance the 
potential biases of such modeling assistance. If sufficiently balanced, this help could 




The companion modeling approach is an iterative participatory process 
involving stakeholders, regulatory agencies, and researchers from 
multiple disciplines in a repeated looping through a three-stage cycle: 
field work and data analysis, model design, and computational 
experiments. Agent-based modeling and role-playing games constitute 
important aspects of this process. The objective is the management of 
complex problems through a continuous learning process rather than 




The contributory nature of our proposal addresses some of the most pressing practical 
problems facing implementation of an ABM of systemic risk.  It incentivizes accurate 
delivery of the required proprietary data and simultaneously provides assistance in 
working through the complexity of that data and the ABM it supports. 
The OFR proposed the use of an ABM to address its multi-dimensional and 
dynamic modeling needs (Bookstaber, 2012).  We believe this approach is best, yet 
recognize that working with private corporations is a matter of addressing incentives. 
Thus, we suggest the OFR develop for use by the FSOC an ABM of the market and 
its participants to measure systemic risk.  These market participants would constantly 
update the model with new transaction and valuation information.  In turn, they 
would be provided access to the model and its results. The proposed contributory 
ABM regulatory structure offers a concise package that incorporates incentives for 
honest data delivery and assistance in producing and maintaining a model that would 
be flexible, up to date, testable for counterfactuals, predictive, and available for use 
by the regulators and regulated.  Such a measurement tool would be “multi-
dimensional, adaptive, real-time, [and] able to incorporate illogic of human choice” 




A potential consequence of our proposed structure is a shift in perspective by 
the market participants.  Systemic risk as defined above is a phenomenon to which 
the market participants are endogenously related.  That is, systemic risk is something 
they can bring about as an emergent effect from their combined individual actions.  
This kind of emergent effect is a natural outcome for ABMs, which support the idea 
of its agents as endogenous actors. Many other models, for computational simplicity, 
presume each institution is instead exogenous to the market.  These financial models, 
and implicitly the market participants who use them, assume that the market will 
continue to set and derive prices with or without the modeled participant present. 
Such models do not support engaging in private actions to mitigate public risk, but 
support the idea of systemic risk as a negative externality.  Individual firms 
participating in our proposed regulatory structure and utilizing access to an ABM 
would begin to implicitly consider themselves instead as endogenous to the market.  
They would see how their choices alter the market and impact their own risk profile.  
This implicit shift in perspective on their place in the market opens the 
question of whether firms would be individually incentivized to move towards a more 
stable market.  They would be able to see that from the collection of individual 
actions a stable market could be created in the same manner as a market collapse.  We 
seek to discover if our proposed regulatory structure leads its participants toward a 
more stable market through their implicit shift in perspective from exogenous to 
endogenous actors.  
In Chapter 2 we describe the experiment and the model we designed for its 




calibrate the model outlined in Chapter 2.  In Chapter 4, we discuss the results of the 
experiment and what they can tell us about the potential benefits of our proposal.  
Finally, we make closing remarks in Chapter 5, including proposals for further study 





Chapter 2: Methodology 
 
We wish to examine whether the construction of our proposed regulatory 
scheme can improve the stability of the marketplace. Access to an ABM of systemic 
risk in the market is provided as incentive for market participants to provide accurate 
and timely data to the FSOC.  The acknowledged benefit is in the additional 
information that should help firms improve their risk strategies and profit margins.  
That same model access may also alter the firms’ assumptions about their level of 
influence over the market.  With an ABM’s implicit view of agents as endogenous to 
the market, the firms using such a model may see the possibilities of greater security 
in working towards a stable market or greater profitability in working towards a more 
volatile market (Smith, Suchanek, & Williams, 1988).  It is unclear whether there 
would be a sufficiently consistent motive for enough of the actors to collectively 
move the market, and in which direction. 
We test this question using an ABM to perform a repeatable experiment 
measuring market outcomes based on the collective acts of individuals.  We first 
model as a control a market outside our regulatory structure whose agents consider 
themselves exogenous to the market.  We then model the market within the proposed 
regulatory scheme, in which the market participants can see that their actions 
endogenously influence their market.  We refer to the ABM used for the control as 
the base model.  The model of the proposed regulatory structure is modified from the 
base model by giving each market participant the option to alter its strategy based on 




nested model.  The outer-level agents of the nested model are the market participants 
with choice in our regulatory structure, and the inner-level model represents each 
participant’s simulation of its potential strategies. We provide a visual depiction of 
the base and nested structures in Figure 1. 
 
   
 
Figure 1 Base Model Control vs. Experimental Nested Model 
The unaltered base model is used as a control.  As an agent-based model of the 
market, it is also the inner level of the nested model that the outer-level firms 
use to decide how to make their update. An altered version of the base model is 
used in the outer level of the nested model to simulate the firms’ behavior in 






We build on the simple market ABM of Thurner, Farmer, and Geanakoplos 
(2012) as the base model for our experiment.  Using a simple pre-developed model as 
the base minimizes assumptions and computational error.  Within that simplicity, the 
base model is still able to demonstrate appropriate market volatility such that the 
proposed regulatory scheme would be able to show an improvement in market 
stabilization.  Other simple market ABMs model the stock market (Outkin, 2012) or 
housing and mortgage-backed securities markets (Geanakoplos et al., 2012); 
Goldstein, 2011), but this one in particular models the sort of market we are looking 
to regulate: the hedge funds and banking industry.  We describe the base model then 
detail what changes were necessary to adapt the base model for the outer level of our 
experiment’s nested model. 
 There are four types of agents in the base model: hedge funds, noise traders, 
banks, and investors.  The hedge funds and noise traders generate the activity in the 
model as they buy and sell a single fixed-value no-dividend asset. The hedge funds 
cannot short the stock or employ any other sort of optionality.  They only buy when 
the price is below the fixed value and hold the asset until forced to sell by a margin 
call from the banks.  Modeling the funds to act based on knowledge of the true value 
reflects the assumption that the hedge funds are rational investors valuing the asset 
based on its fundamentals. The noise traders, on the other hand, are called such 
because they represent traders who do not base buy and sell decisions on the 
fundamentals of the stock’s value.  Thus, they both make decisions based on ‘noise’ 
and generate ‘noise’ in the data of supply and demand for the stock.  Their 




stock over or under the fixed fundamental value.  This mispricing allows the hedge 
funds to take a long position (i.e., buying and holding) when the mispricing is 
advantageous. The banks provide leverage to the hedge funds to buy more of the 
asset, but require the hedge funds to meet a margin call if they exceed their maximum 
leverage.  That is, the hedge funds must sell some of the asset to maintain a required 
maximum loan-to-value ratio on the loan from the banks to the value of the stock held 
as collateral. The investors track the return on investment for each hedge fund and 
invest capital that can be leveraged with the banks into those funds whose forecasted 
performance is better than a set benchmark return.  The parameters and variables used 
to calculate and control these activities are listed in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 Parameter & Variable List 
Fixed	   Time	  Dependent	   Hedge	  Fund	  Dependent	  
a	   Parameter	  for	  calculating	  Returns	   mt	   Mispricing	   C
it	   Cash	  
b	   Investor	  Sensitivity	  to	  Return	   pt	  	   Price	   Dit	   Demand	  
H	   Total	  Hedge	  Funds	   ζt	  
Noise	  Trader	  
Expenditure	   F
it	   Investor	  Funds	  
N	  	   Supply	   χt	   Random	  Variate	   r’it	   Raw	  Returns	  
rb	   Benchmark	  Return	   	   	   r
it	   Forecast	  Returns	  
T	   Total	  Time	  Steps	   	   	   W
it	   Wealth	  
V	  	   Fixed	  Value	  of	  the	  Asset	   	   	   β
i	  	   Aggressiveness	  
We	   Minimum	  Wealth	   	   	   	   	  
W0	  	   Initial	  Wealth	   	   	   	   	  
λmax	   Leverage	  Limit	   	   	   	   	  
ρ	   Parameter	  for	  calculating	  Noise	  Trader	  Expenditure	   	   	   	   	  




 All market activity is performed in a series of T time steps.  These time steps 
are iterations of the simultaneous equations that define relationships between the four 
types of agents. At each time step t, the model solves for a market-clearing price pt, 
which is the numerical solution to a system of simultaneous equations.  To be a 
market-clearing price, pt must generate sufficient demand such that the total sum of 
the demand for the stock from the hedge funds and noise traders is equivalent to the 
total supply N.  
 The noise trader demand is inversely proportional to the market-clearing 
price, as the expenditure of the noise traders is generated without regard to the price 
of the asset to represent the lack of fundamental analysis performed by such traders.  
Their demand is calculated in the equation for the market-clearing price as the 
amount of demand supported at a price by the given expenditure.  As the price drops, 
the same expense can buy more stock, increasing the noise traders’ demand.  The 
hedge funds’ demand values are also interdependent with the market-clearing price, 
but through a more complicated set of nested equations.  These equations are 
designed to incorporate the incentives of the hedge funds and the other two agents in 
the model, the bankers and investors.  
 The nested equations cover investor returns and flow of capital, hedge fund 
wealth, and the hedge fund demand as limited by the banks’ leverage limit.  The new 
market price determines the return on investment over the last time step, which in 
turn influences the investors’ flow of capital to the hedge fund.  The change in price, 
the associated current retail value of the held assets, and the investor flow of capital 




and the new price relative to the fixed fundamental value V are what ultimately set the 
demand for each fund.  Thus, the market-clearing price equation is the avenue 
through which the confluence of individual requirements for return, invested capital, 
and wealth yields collective outcomes as it balances the demands of the noise traders 
and all hedge funds. 
 Independently of the market-clearing price, the noise traders generate an 
amount ζt that they will spend to purchase the asset.  The expenditure is solved for 
from the equation 
ln ζ! = 𝜌 ∗ ln 𝜁!!! + 𝜎 ∗ 𝜒! + 1 − 𝜌 ∗ ln 𝑉 ∗ 𝑁                             (1) 
where χt is a random variate drawn from a normal distribution with mean 0 and 
standard deviation 1, V is the value of the asset, and N is the asset supply. In the 
absence of the hedge funds and with ρ < 1, this expenditure would generate a price 
which is mean reverting around the fixed value V.  With χt distributed N(0,1), the 
product σχt is distributed N(0, σ2) and ln(ζt) is normally distributed around a 
weighting of its prior value and ln(VN).  Being the only time-variant value 
independent of the price, this expenditure determines the nature of the market 
exogenous to the hedge funds. 
 With this value for expenditure fixed, the total noise demand given by 
𝜁!
𝑝!
                                                                                                                                (2) 
is inversely proportional to the price pt.  The market-clearing equation must find this 
price at time step t such that the sum of the noise trader demand and fund demands Dti 










− 𝑁 = 0                                                                              (3) 
 With the hedge funds only allowed to take a simple long position in the 
market, hedge fund demand is only generated when the price pt is less than the fixed 
value V, generating a mispricing mt = V - pt > 0.  Then, an individual hedge fund i has 
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where βi is the hedge fund aggressiveness parameter, Wti is the fund’s wealth at time 
step t, and λmax is the maximum leverage allowed for all funds by the banks.  Thus, 
the demand is proportional to the wealth, mispricing on the asset and aggressiveness 
of the hedge fund, but limited by the maximum leverage the banks allow for the 
funds.  
 It can be seen that the demand (4) is a function of the price and that the price 
(3) is a function of the demand.  The demand also depends on all of the other 
functions, and so acts as the conduit for their influence over the price. This is shown 
in Figure 2 where we depict the logical layout of the set of simultaneous equations 
that define the relationships between the four types of agents. 
 The wealth at time t is also directly impacted by the price. Wealth is defined 
as the value of the held assets plus cash, where cash will have a negative value if the 
fund is borrowing from the banks (5). We take the sum of the previous period’s 
wealth plus the increased value of held assets and this round’s flow of cash from 
investors, Fti, to determine the amount of wealth available to each hedge fund i for 




    𝑊!!!! = 𝐶!!!! + 𝐷!!!! ∗ 𝑝!!!                                         (5) 
          𝑊!! =𝑊!!!! + 𝑝! − 𝑝!!! ∗ 𝐷!!!! + 𝐹!!                            (6) 
 
 
Substituting, we see that (6) can also be written as the sum of the previous period’s 
cash with the revised retail value of the currently held assets under price pt and the 
current influx of cash from investors Fti (7).  This leaves only two avenues to grow or 
lose wealth in a new round: the change in price and the influence of the investor’s 
capital. 




Figure 2 Flow Chart of 1 Time Step  
The only value calculated independently in each time step is the noise 
expenditure.  All other values are historical or rely on the market-clearing price, 
which in turn depends on the demand generated by the sequence of equations 
beginning with last period’s returns. A numerical example of this flow for a 3-





 The flow of capital from investors Fti, meanwhile, is calculated as  
    𝐹!! = 𝑏 ∗ 𝑟!! − 𝑟! ∗ (𝐷!!!! ∗ 𝑝! + 𝐶!!!! )                          (8) 
The investors will invest cash into a hedge fund if they expect that fund to generate 
returns on their capital larger than a benchmark return rb that they could expect to 
receive on average in some other market. In the event that the expected return rti is 
greater than the benchmark return, this equation returns the positive amount the 
investors put into the hedge fund proportional to the parameter b that determines the 
investors’ sensitivity to return, the margin of their success, and the fund’s pre-investor 
wealth.  In the event that the expected return rti is less than the benchmark return, this 
value will be negative and the investors will attempt to withdraw that amount.  This 
withdrawal is capped such that the maximum amount of wealth investors can take 
from a hedge fund is its total wealth.  
 The expected return rti used by the investors to determine their flow of funds 
is a moving average on the actual return r’ti.  This is a “well-documented” behavior 
according to the authors, citing Busse (2001), Chevalier and Ellison (1997), and 
others.  This behavior “guarantees steady-state behavior with well-defined long-term 
statistical averages of the wealth of the hedge funds” (Thurner, Farmer, & 
Geanakoplos, 2012).    
𝑟!! = 1 − 𝑎 ∗ 𝑟!!!! + 𝑎 ∗ 𝑟!!!                                                                         (9) 
 
With a < 1, this weighted average sets the expected return to be an adjustment on the 
prior time step’s expectation in the direction of the actual return.  As a approaches 1, 
more value is placed on the actual return.  In the base model, we set a to 0.99. The 




wealth in the previous time step.  This is the final equation in the set of nested 
simultaneous equations generating each fund’s demand interdependent on price. 
      
𝑟!!! =
𝐷!!!! ∗ 𝑝! − 𝑝!!!
𝑊!!!!
                                                                                  (10) 
 
 
The base model also places a lower bound on the wealth for each hedge fund. 
If any fund falls below 10% of the initial wealth value W0, the hedge fund is assumed 
to be bankrupt.  The model sets the fund’s wealth and demand to 0, and after a set 
number of time steps, replaces the bankrupt fund in the market with a new hedge fund 
having the same initial parameters as the one that exited the market. 
The nested model operates on the same market structure and agents as the 
base model. The only difference is that the nested model gives the hedge fund agents 
in the outer level the ability to change one parameter in the model that is descriptive 
of a characteristic within their control: their aggressiveness β in response to a market 
mispricing m.  We modified the base model to include this option in the outer-level 
model. 
Each hedge fund in the outer level is given access to the inner-level model to 
select their aggressiveness parameter for the next round.  They run the inner-level 
model for different trial variations on the aggressiveness parameter and choose the β 
that returns the best outcome from those trials as diagramed in Figure 3. The inner-
level model is structured exactly like the base model, running for T time steps on the 
four types of agents.  While the base model is given the same inputs at the start of 
each market simulation as the outer-level market simulation runs, the inner-level 




model runs T time steps on the four types of agents whose initial values are the values 
of the outer-level simulation at time t.  That is, any one hedge fund in the outer-level 
runs its trials of the inner-level model using data from its current market environment.  
For each of the trials, a hedge fund experiments with a different β for itself, but the 
β’s for the other funds in the inner-level model are fixed at those of the other outer-
level funds at time t.  We take on the role of the FSOC in providing this updated data 
to the ABM for each fund to use for simulation. 
 
 
Figure 3 Outer-level Parameter Update Flow 
The flow of the inner-level model in updating the β for an outer-level hedge fund i.  
The regulator prepopulates the outer-level values as the initial values for the inner-
level simulation.  Each hedge fund then alters its current β and runs trials of the 
inner-level model.  The outer-level fund chooses to update its β to the one that 





The markets used by the outer-level funds in the inner-level model must be 
the same for each trial of β to generate a fair comparison.  These markets must also be 
different from the market in which the outer-level funds operate to simulate the firms’ 
lack of information about the future of their own market, and different across the 
trials of the different hedge funds to simulate lack of collaboration or different market 
forecasts produced by different firms.  These requirements on the trial markets can be 
met by controlling the random numbers that generate the noise trader demand.  As 
shown above in Figure 2, the noise trader demand is the only equation exogenous to 
the hedge funds. From equation (1), demand is driven by a recursive function that 
calls the random variate χ.  If we control χ, we control the exogenous markets of all 
simulations. 
 Computerized random number generators generate random numbers from a 
seed value and a deterministic algorithm.  Given the same seed value, the random 
number generator runs its algorithm and generates the exact same sequence of 
random numbers.  We only need to ensure that the random number generators for the 
inner-level trials of an individual hedge fund are all given the same seed value in one 
time step in order to generate the same χ and thus the same exogenous markets for an 
even comparison of the fund’s test β’s.  To meet the other requirements on the 
markets, we need to ensure that this seed value is different from the seed values of the 
other hedge funds’ trials at that same time step, and also different from the seed value 
for the outer-level market’s χ.   
 This type of control is possible with a process known as common random 




for each trial simulation.  Not only does it allow direct comparison of trial β’s for 
each outer-level hedge fund as required for the experiment, this same method allows 
direct market comparison of the results for the base and nested models as detailed in 
Chapter 4.  Clark (1990) discusses the use of common random numbers for such 
output comparison. 
 
[Assume] that the simulation output is stochastic and has a distribution 
that is unknown to the analyst.  This paper presents methods for making 
comparisons by either ranking alternatives or selecting the best 
alternative with respect to a single output performance measure.  To 
increase the effectiveness of the comparisons, these methods are able to 
use the variance reduction technique of common random numbers. […]  
Variance reduction techniques offer the potential for reducing the 
number of replications required for an experimental objective. […]  The 
ability to use the same random numbers for each alternative offers the 
potential for sharpening the comparisons.  This is an example of a 
variance reduction technique and is called common random numbers.  It 




 Although the influence of the noise traders is determined by controlled 
random values, the inner-level model run by the funds is otherwise prepopulated with 
the outer-level parameters at time t.  This includes the wealth and aggressiveness of 
the other funds, which is proprietary information each fund requires to be kept 
unknown.  It is not necessary to assume that the hedge funds in the outer level each 
have access to these updated proprietary values, however.  While they are allowed 
access to the inner-level model to make assessments for their choice of β, the details 
of the model and its inputs are not made known to them – it is a black box operation.  
The regulator is the owner of the model in this scenario and prepopulates the market 




without revealing that data to the outer-level funds.  Not even the regulator needs to 
know the raw values.  The regulatory system could operate in a fully-homomorphic 
encryption scheme, which is a scheme designed to provide encrypted results 
calculated on encrypted data (Gentry, 2009). 
 Once all options are run through the inner model, the outer-level funds must 
choose the value for β they wish to implement in the next time step of the outer-level 
model.  There are many possible data points to use in optimizing the utility of the 
hedge funds.  Wealth, return, and bankruptcy events are all model outputs from the 
agent-based model.  However, these outputs may all return greatly different values 
depending on the random market on which the outer-level fund is running the inner-
level model.  Rather than look at any one metric of profit or loss, we measure utility 
using the Sharpe ratio.   
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑝𝑒  𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =
𝐸 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛
𝐸 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘                                                                             (11) 
 
The Sharpe ratio is a measure of risk-weighted return. It serves as a consistent 
measure across different risk and profit environments of the expected return for the 
same amount of risk.  A higher Sharpe ratio would indicate that in the same risk 
environment, more profit could be made.  Alternatively, for the same amount of 
profit, there is less accompanying risk.  Each fund updates its β to the tested value of 
aggressiveness that produces the highest Sharpe ratio in simulated markets.   
Once each hedge fund selects its aggressiveness based on results from the 
inner-level simulations, the outer level of the nested model simulates one time step 
with these newly updated parameters.  The noise traders’ expenditure ζt for the outer-




given the equations for wealth, investment, demand and return as in the base model. 
Though the outer-level agents implicitly develop an endogenous view of 
themselves in the market by running simulations of their own positions, the 
simulations they run are of agents still considering themselves exogenous to the 
market.  However, the only way to model perceived endogeneity throughout all levels 
of simulation is to generate an infinite cascade of nested models.  Therefore, we 
provide the outer level with an ABM of funds considering themselves as exogenous 
to the market for simplicity.  This simplicity at the cost of accuracy may limit the 
capacity of the outer-level funds to appropriately judge the value of an update to their 
strategy and also dampen the potential market impact of the shift to an endogenous 
perspective by market participants.  Nonetheless, models should test results from their 
simplest formulations before implementing more complex practice, so we retained 





Chapter 3: Verification, Validation & Calibration 
 
 There is a continually developing process of validation, verification, and 
calibration (VVC) for agent-based models to ensure that the results accurately 
represent the intention of the model, the right model has been chosen for the task, and 
the parameters are properly set. Many articles have been written on the verification 
and validation process, often aimed at specific computer programs or markets, or at 
larger industry. Even general principles are still being developed and debated (Matteo 
Richiardi, 2006).  Although the concept is easy to describe, the execution is a set of 
processes as complex as the models it seeks to cover.  VVC provides the surety of use 
required for a computer-programmed ABM that would be derived in mathematical 
models from a set of proofs and axioms.  
 Verification ensures that there are no ‘bugs’ in the computer program: that no 
error prevented the program from running to completion, and no quirk of syntax 
allowed the code to run to completion while performing unintended computations.  
Validation is the process to ensure that the right model was selected to address the 
given problem.  Calibration is used to adjust the value of unmeasured or underived 
parameters.  
 
Model Verification is substantiating that the model is transformed from 
one form into another, as intended, with sufficient accuracy. Model 
verification deals with building the model right. The accuracy of 
transforming a problem formulation into a model specification or the 
accuracy of converting a model representation from a micro flowchart 






Model Validation is substantiating that the model, within its domain of 
applicability, behaves with satisfactory accuracy consistent with the 
[modeling and simulation] objectives. Model validation deals with 
building the right model. 
 (Balci, 1997) 
 
 
 Specific verification steps depend on the computer program being used, but 
involve checking output at successive phases of calculation. According to Sargent 
(2007), “To develop a valid simulation model, several versions of a model are usually 
developed prior to obtaining a satisfactory valid simulation model. During every 
model iteration, model verification and validation are performed.” Specific validation 
steps depend on the context of the model and the available parties for development.  
Calibration is an iterative and often numerical process.  Sargent goes on to provide an 
alphabetical list of verification, validation, and calibration techniques that can be used 
subjectively or objectively, and usually in combination: 
1. Animation 
2. Comparison to Other Models 
3. Degenerate Tests 
4. Event Validity 
5. Extreme Condition Tests 
6. Face Validity 
7. Historical Data Validation 
8. Historical Methods  
9. Internal Validity 
10. Multi-stage Validation 
11. Operational Graphics 
12. Parameter Variability-Sensitivity Analysis 
13. Predictive Validation 
14. Traces 
15. Turing Tests 
  
For the base and nested model, twelve of the fifteen techniques were used as 
described in his work.  Similar to the original base model authors, we did not include 




exhibiting the behavior of a system graphically over time such as the movement of 
parts through a factory, and there is no spatial component to the models to view for 
accuracy. Also, neither the base nor nested models are sufficiently detailed to make 
falsifiable predictive outcomes or to fool an expert into thinking its outcomes are true 
values for a Turing test.   
The other twelve tests break down into two subgroups in our testing: those 
that are designed to demonstrate the plausibility of the model’s initial design and 
those that are designed to check numeric outcomes or set numeric inputs to ensure the 
model behaves according to expectation.  Face validity, the historical methods 
technique and multi-stage validation ensure plausibility.  The rest are different angles 
on numeric output checks. 
Face validity is having the support of subject matter experts (SMEs).  SMEs 
can validate the model assumptions whether those assumptions are made about the 
structure of the model, its equations or parameters, or the data on which the model is 
built. Sargent’s historical methods are rationalism, in which it is assumed that 
everyone knows whether underlying assumptions are true and reasonable; 
empiricism, which requires every assumption and outcome be empirically validated; 
and positive economics.   “Positive economics requires only that the model be able to 
predict the future and is not concerned with a model’s assumptions or structure” 
(Sargent, 2007).  What he calls multi-stage validation is a combination of these three 
historical methods where possible.  For our models, the outcomes cannot be tested 
empirically nor the future predicted, but the model assumptions are common enough 




The second subgroup of validation techniques is intrinsically tied to the 
verification and calibration processes as all are meant to check the correctness of 
numeric values.   These techniques can also overlap each other in scope, but for the 
sake of implementation in different environments, it is still good to have them listed 
separately.  Comparison to other models requires a sufficiently comparable market 
model to test correctness of overall output.  Degenerate tests look for appropriate 
outcomes as inputs approach the limits, while extreme condition tests require 
plausible outcomes from any combination of extreme or unlikely factors in the 
system.  Also encroaching on the degenerate test is sensitivity analysis, which looks 
for appropriate model behavior in response to changing values of the inputs and 
internal parameters.  Event validity asks if the occurrences of events in the model 
compare appropriately to real systems, overlapping the scope of historical data 
validation that tests if the model behaves in the same manner as available historical 
data.  Internal validity involves performing several runs of the model to test for 
consistency across multiple outputs. Operational graphics and trace testing both 
involve tracking data points over time to ensure the data maintains the proper values.  
Operational graphics charts various performance measures, while trace testing 
follows the logic of particular agents or entities.  Assuming that model and structure 
plausibility were obtained at the outset by the first subgroup, this second subgroup of 
VVC techniques ensures that the assumptions and logic considered plausible are 
implemented correctly and yield expected or reasonable values. 
We first outline the VVC behind the base model, which is both the control for 




verification and calibration can be drawn from the original paper, but we add a 
description of the VVC for the extra steps necessary to make the base model available 
for use by the nested model. We then discuss the VVC of the additional components 
brought on by the creation of the nested model. 
 The plausibility provided by the face validity and rationale of the base model 
is what sets the stage for the rest of the VVC process for both the base and nested 
models. Face validity of the base model is established through the credentials of the 
authors of the original model and the model’s subsequent academic support. The 
authors are established SMEs in finance, economics, and complexity theory.  Other 
subject matter experts have added face validity to the model by publishing the paper 
in a peer-reviewed journal and using it as a citation in more than fifty other published 
papers. The OFR added institutional face validity by naming it as the example model 
in the area of banks and asset managers in a discussion on ABM (Bookstaber, 2012).   
The rationality of the base model is tied to its simplicity.  Simplicity in 
modeling helps minimize the need for more complex VVC operations. 
The goal of agent-based modeling is to enrich our understanding of 
fundamental processes that may appear in a variety of applications.  It 
is important to keep the model as simple as possible.  When a 
surprising result occurs, it is very helpful to be confident that one can 
understand everything that contributed to the model.  Simplicity is also 
helpful in giving other researchers a realistic chance of extending 
one’s model in new directions.  While the topic being investigated may 
be complicated, the assumptions underlying the agent-based model 
should be simple.  The complexity of agent-based modeling should be 
in the simulated results, not in the assumptions of the model. 
(Axelrod, 1997) 
 
The assumptions of the model are relatively few.  There is no input data except for 




cannot be missing, extreme-valued, or of a different distribution than the model 
specifications expect.  The structural assumptions are also few, as the authors 
maintained a simple model.  This simple rationality can be seen in the following 
areas: 
1) The total wealth of a hedge fund is only composed of cash and one asset. 
2) There are only two types of traders, neither of which is illogical. 
3) The value traders can only take a long position on the asset, with no 
optionality. 
4) Funds leverage from the banks at 0% interest. 
5) Banks and investors are ‘deep-pocketed’, so there is no tightening of 
liquidity. 
6) No accounting is necessary for how much stock was bought at which price 
for gains/loss analysis. 
7) Investors, noise traders, and banks are each represented by one equation 
accounting for their influence as a representative aggregate without 
attempting to model individuals’ market choices. 
While the limitations on the model keep it simple, so do the underlying structure, 
function, and parameter choices as described in Chapter 2.  Most conform to common 
economic reason, and the more complex equations are drawn from supported 
literature.  The authors, in their own words, “build the simplest model possible.” 
The numeric validation of the original base model was not described 
explicitly, but was made evident throughout the discussion in the paper.  Many graphs 




rational design.  Degenerate tests of mispricings at different levels produced expected 
demand values, extreme price conditions were checked and found to generate 
outcomes that could be seen as reasonable risk reduction strategies, and price 
movements and distributions were seen to align with historic data trends. Many runs 
of the base model demonstrated internal validity by telling the same economic story 
across various outputs.  Operational graphics were used throughout the paper, and 
some of the sensitivity analysis was discussed.  An example is the value of the 
benchmark return, rb, which was determined through sensitivity analysis and 
discussed in general terms.  
If the benchmark return is set very low then funds will become very 
wealthy and will buy a large quantity of the asset under even small 
mispricings, preventing the mispricing from ever growing large. This 
effectively induces a hard floor on prices. If the benchmark return is 
set very high, funds accumulate little wealth and play a negligible role 
in price formation. The interesting behavior is observed at intermediate 
values of rb where the funds’ demand is comparable to that of the noise 
traders.  (Thurner et al., 2012) 
 
Accepting the VVC of the base model as presented in the original paper, we 
still needed to retest the model with the numeric subgroup of tests. We received the 
validated original base model as a set of MATLAB scripts but needed to translate that 
into a working SAS model.  We planned to build the nested model in SAS once the 
base model was established, and so we needed the base model to be implemented in 
SAS to use it as a control with common random numbers.  We performed iterative 
rounds of verification and validation as we converted the base model into SAS. 
The most heavily used VVC techniques in this part of the process were trace 
testing, operational graphics, and the comparison to other models.  We repeatedly 




the equations that defined their behavior in the proper sequence, as well as 
operational graphics to check that the patterns claimed in the original base paper were 
generated by the translated model. With the SAS model running as expected, we 
compared it to the validated MATLAB version on specified inputs. The equivalence 
of the SAS and MATLAB base models anchors the new version to the VVC from the 
original paper. 
The only structural difference between the outer level of the nested program 
and the base model is that the funds in that outer level are given the power of choice, 
whose power and effect we wish to measure.  Plausibility for the structure of this 
choice is based on rationalism.  The numeric VVC we performed prior to generating 
experimental results checks numeric outcomes and sets numeric inputs to ensure the 
model behaves according to expectations.  It will be in the examination of the results 
that the final validation is implicitly performed: checking for reasonable values 
returned from changes to the inputs, event validity, or extreme conditions. 
Giving the outer-level hedge funds the power of choice at each time step 
requires a design for the funds’ options as well as their decision process.  We chose a 
simple set of options for each fund: increase the aggressiveness, decrease the 
aggressiveness, or maintain the same aggressiveness.  In the original base model, 
there are ten hedge funds with initial β’s in intervals of five.  So that each fund could 
test whether it would be better off with one of its competitors’ values, we give each 
fund the option to change its aggressiveness by +/- 5, or not at all.2  We constrain the 
aggressiveness to be at least five because a value of zero or a negative value is 
                                                
2 We also tested different percentages by which to let the funds change their β. This 




without meaning in this model.   We did not set a cap on the funds’ possible choices, 
however, to see if and how they would choose to become more aggressive than their 
initial values.  Operational graphics showed that this occasionally generated values in 
the hundreds.  We also decided to experiment with the aggressiveness parameter as a 
set of values assigned to different class variables, one for each possible level of 
aggressiveness. In this scenario, rather than allowing the funds to increase or decrease 
their aggressiveness in the manner of addition, the choice would be on which 
aggressiveness class yielded the best results.  We limited this second scenario to half 
the number of funds in the original base model to limit the computational complexity.  
The original ten funds with three options require thirty trials, and five funds each 
selecting from five aggressiveness classes require twenty-five.  One hundred inner-
level trials would have been required in each time step t had we given all ten funds 
the choice of any of ten class values. 
 During each time step, the hedge funds calculate the Sharpe ratio (11) for each 
simulated aggressiveness option and select the β that delivers the greatest return given 
the risk.  The Sharpe ratio is a simple business finance tool that is useful for 
comparing performance across risk profiles.  We chose this to be the measure for our 
outer-level hedge funds because we anticipate that both the profitability and risk 
measures will change in the output of the inner-level model under different β’s. 
Numeric VVC for the nested model began with a comparison to the SAS base 
model using common random numbers.  Before performing our experiment looking 
for variation due to choice, we ensured that without choice the nested and base 




choice itself by ensuring the outer-level hedge funds were generating their trial 
options successfully and correctly interpreting and implementing the results.  We also 
compared the inner-level model to the base model using set inputs and common 
random numbers.  This ensured that the outer-level funds’ tool for testing their 
options and observing their endogeneity in the system was operating correctly.  
Beyond testing the validity of the structure of choice for the outer level of the 
nested model, we tested the amount of information available to make that choice. 
Sensitivity analysis was performed in two areas: the number of inner-level model 
iterations required per trial of β to return consistent results across different random 
market environments, and the required length in time steps of each inner-level model 
iteration.  These two aspects of the information provided to the outer-level hedge 
funds are intertwined. We needed to ensure that the amount of information provided 
to the hedge fund about the success of each trial of β would yield a noticeable trend 
above the noise of the random market simulations.  If an outer-level fund could not 
make a consistent choice in its trials of options, then we could not expect the power 
of choice to produce meaningful deviation from the base model without choice. On 
the other hand, providing each hedge fund less information for each trial would 
reduce computational complexity and duration, allowing us to perform more 
validation and experimental runs of the nested model.  These sensitivity tests were 
performed as if from the point of view of an outer-level hedge fund running its 





To test the impact of lowering the information available to the hedge funds on 
the consistency of choice, we recalculated the classic Sharpe ratio on subgroups of 
100 markets.  By using the same 100 markets throughout the test we were able to 
compare directly how the same information viewed differently might alter the pattern 
of choice. We started with the most informed choice based on all 100 markets.  For 
five of the six tested markets, the aggressiveness that returned the highest Sharpe ratio 
was the least aggressive option available to the funds.  With this option as the most 
selected, we then tested how often this same choice was made as the 100 markets 
were broken up into smaller subgroups providing less information per choice. We 
found that even looking at only one run of the base model, the funds chose the same 
option in the majority of cases as they had in the test using 100 runs.  Further, fund 9 
of the ten-fund market, which had initially chosen the middle of its three 
aggressiveness options when given 100 trials on which to base one choice, began 
choosing the least aggressive option in line with the other funds with greater 
frequency as it was given less information by running fewer trials per choice.  This 
brought it into greater consistency with the other funds’ selections as shown in Table 
2.   
We decided to run the nested model using a single inner-level model run to 
inform the choice of the hedge funds based on this sensitivity analysis. Each fund 
should make the same choice on average if given only one inner-level trial run as they 
would make with 100 trials, so an effect should still be observable.  Furthermore, 
limiting the number of trial runs required for each of 25 or 30 choices at each time 




available to run multiple replications of the nested model. However, in 
implementation, when the outer-level funds are running the inner-level simulations in 
real time and are not themselves the subject of experiment, more trials per choice 
would be used to ensure greater accuracy of judgment. 
 
Table 2 The share of choices made at each trial count level that were the least aggressive option 
available 
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  Fund	  Market,	  t	  =	  0	  
 















Aggressiveness	  β0	   5	   15	   25	  
 
10	   25	   45	  
Trials/ 
Choice # Choices 	   	   	  	  
 
	  	   	   	  	  
100	   1	   100%	   100%	   100%	  
 
100%	   100%	   0%	  
50	   2	   100%	   100%	   100%	  
 
100%	   100%	   50%	  
25	   4	   100%	   100%	   100%	  
 
100%	   100%	   25%	  
10	   10	   100%	   100%	   100%	  
 
90%	   90%	   20%	  
5	   20	   95%	   100%	   80%	  
 
90%	   75%	   20%	  
2	   50	   70%	   74%	   64%	  
 
68%	   66%	   36%	  
1	   100	   56%	   65%	   52%	  
 
54%	   60%	   40%	  
 
  
The final analysis on quantity of available information for the hedge funds’ 
decision is on the length in time steps of each of the market simulations. The base, 
outer-level, and inner-level models each iterate across T time steps.  Since the outer-
level model is running the inner-level model at each of the outer-level time steps, the 
influence of T on the running time is quadratic in the nested model.  Consequently, 
we performed an internal validation using operational graphics and ran several tests 
of the base model to find the minimum number of time steps required to demonstrate 
the results validated in the original paper. We ran base models for values of T ranging 




for the original base model at 50,000 time steps and the SAS base model at 5,000 
time steps, which was the smallest value at which the base model still demonstrated 
its validated relationships and sufficient market dynamics.   
We used the same approach to validate the nested model against the base 
model (Figure 6).  The validity of the base paper’s conclusions should not alter based 
on the modeled perceptions of the market participants.  The change in price should 
still be more clustered than the change in noise demand, and both should travel 
randomly around their means.  In addition, a buildup of leverage should correlate 
with a market crash. Similar to how we ensured these patterns were visible in the time 
step limited version of the base model, we verified these claims were sill valid in the 
nested model. These results affirm that the nested model maintained the validity 
established in the base model.   
We performed 12 of 15 of Sargent’s VVC processes to ensure the surety of 
use of the nested model.  We started by returning to the source and reiterating the 
VVC of the base model, and validated the proper transition of the base model into the 
SAS programming environment.  The validated base model provided the platform 
against which to validate the nested model. We then verified, validated, and tested all 
aspects of the method and performance of choice in the nested model, from the 
rationale of the design to its appropriate implementation.  These tests properly 
completed, we were then able to match the output patterns of the nested model with 





Figure 4 Base Paper Results 
This figure taken from the base paper, pg. 14, with the most representative data 







Figure 5 Mock Base Paper Results on Time Step Limited Model 
One of several figures generated by our SAS base model in finding the 
minimum of 5,000 time steps required to generate comparable market behavior 





Figure 6 Nested Model Results  
A market’s worth of results of the 5-fund 5-change complete nested model set in 
the manner of the base paper demonstrate the preserved relationships of the 




Chapter 4: Experimental Results & Insights 
 
We developed and validated the nested ABM of the proposed regulatory 
scheme to determine whether its implicitly endogenous structure would lead market 
participants towards a calmer market. A few key metrics are of particular interest for 
this experiment.  Price volatility, market crashes, and bankruptcy behavior provide an 
account of the effective market stability.  These measures provide data on what took 
place in the market.  The amount of leverage in the marketplace and its dynamics 
provide information on the market risk underlying this model’s market.  As the base 
paper showed, there is a relationship between increased leverage and market crashes.  
Finally, the individual and overall market wealth and investor returns address the 
issue of incentivized participation and whether the benefit of additional knowledge 
enhances performance for the funds. We compared the results of the base and nested 
models across these different metrics generated in 30 simulated markets of 5,000 time 
steps each using an unpooled two-sample t-test, assuming unequal variances.  We 
also ran a paired t-test. With comparable results, we report the more conservative test. 
We look first to the effective market stability measures as the most direct 
answer to the question of market impact under the regulatory proposal.  The results, 
as shown in Table 3, were mixed by the different variables measured but overall show 
a slightly more stable market when the agents consider themselves endogenous to the 
market. The base model with five hedge funds generated 87 bankruptcies, whereas 
the base model of ten funds generated 495.  The five-fund five-choice (5x5) nested 




model with only 45 bankruptcies over the 30 markets, and the ten-fund three-choice 
(10x3) nested model also came in with fewer at 441.  The drop in bankruptcy rate of 
the 10x3 model is not significant, but the drop in bankruptcies for the five-fund 
nested model is significant at the α = .05 level.  There were more market crashes – 
defined as a collapse in total market wealth of 50% or more – in both versions of the 
nested model than in their correspondent base models.  Neither difference was 
statistically significant (α = .05).  In many cases, multiple market crashes were 
counted in less than fifteen time steps of the same market.  This relative closeness in 
time makes these market crashes effectively part of the same market downturn, 
weakening the impact of the metric.  Finally, comparing the average standard 
deviation of the asset price across the 30 markets did not turn up any statistical 
difference (α = .05) between the base and nested model. The 5x5 and 10x3 models 
demonstrate greater or equal effective market stability than their base market controls 
in the aggregate, accounting for the markets where the nested models counted 
multiple market crashes in the same downturn.  
 
Table 3 Effective market stability as measured in three variables 
averaged across the 30 markets of the two fund/choice scenarios 










Base	  5	   2.9	  (0.6)	   0.6	  (0.1)	   0.21	  (0.01)	  
5x5	   1.5	  (0.5)	   0.7	  (0.2)	   0.23	  (0.01)	  
Base	  10	   16.5	  (3.0)	   2.0	  (0.3)	   0.21	  (0.01)	  
10x3	   14.7	  (2.0)	   2.5	  (0.4)	   0.21	  (0.01)	  
 
NOTE: Bold values are significantly different between base and 





   
 
The model of endogenous market participants yielded increased effective 
market stability, but another important factor in true market stability is the underlying 
tension that drives and heightens the effective market volatility.  Overleveraged 
markets are at a greater risk of experiencing a downturn as banks’ margin calls put 
the price into a downward spiral (Thurner et al., 2012).  In the nested models, this risk 
is reduced: the average leverage is lower and the standard deviation of leverage is 
smaller. These metrics are significantly more stable (α = .05) in the 5x5 model than 
the five-fund base model.  The 10x3 and 5x5 nested models had greater values for the 
maximum overall and individual fund leverage in any time step, but these outliers did 
not overshadow the statistically lower leverage of the endogenous agents in the five-
fund model (Table 4). 
 
Table 4 Aggregate market risk as measured in four variables across the two fund/ 
choice scenarios of the nested model and their base model controls. 
	  
Average	  Across	  Markets	   Max	  Across	  Time	  Steps	  







Base	  5	   1.19	  (0.04)	   0.89	  (0.02)	   5.7	   10.8	  
5x5	   0.84	  (0.04)	   0.61	  (0.03)	   11.5	   15.3	  
Base	  10	   1.41	  (0.04)	   1.03	  (0.03)	   15.9	   20	  
10x3	   1.32	  (0.06)	   0.99	  (0.05)	   16.6	   20	  
 
Note: Bold values are significantly different between base and nested versions at 
the α = .05 level.  Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
  
 
The greater effective market stability shown in the decreased bankruptcies and 
the lower underlying risk measured in decreased leverage were both generated 




Looking at the funds’ results, we measure the success of their attempts to improve 
their market position. 
The values of wealth and return given in Table 5 show that the 5x5 nested 
model is less profitable than the base five-fund model when measuring the average 
wealth and return in the market place across all hedge fund positions, regardless of 
any one fund’s price of bankruptcy.  The lower average wealth of the 5x5 and 10x3 
models is significant at the α = .05 level.  In both the 5x5 and 10x3 scenarios, funds 
do not have an incentive to participate in such a structure if the success of the nested 
funds is measured by wealth or return alone. 
 
Table 5 Aggregate wealth & returns across the two fund/choice scenarios of the nested model and their 
base model controls 
	  
Average	  Across	  Markets	   Extremes	  Across	  Time	  Steps	  















Base	  5	   18.23	  (4.5)	   0.09%	  	  
(0.02%)	   8.7%	   -­‐17.2%	   14.6%	   -­‐28.6%	  
5x5	   13.84	  (5.42)	   0.09%	  	  
(0.02%)	   32.2%	   -­‐14.2%	   58.8%	   -­‐20.4%	  
Base	  10	   8.7	  (1.89)	   0.04%	  	  
(0.03%)	   30.2%	   -­‐33.8%	   100.9%	   -­‐61.5%	  
10x3	   7.41	  (1.68)	   0.03%	  	  
(0.03%)	   16.6%	   -­‐29.0%	   122.7%	   -­‐84.4%	  
 
NOTE: returns measured include returns of 0 from bankrupt funds. Bold values are significantly 
different between base and nested versions at the α = .05 level.  Standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. 
 
Whereas any one fund would like to generate the most wealth, it is also true that 
those with the greatest profits are the most prone to bankruptcy.  This effect is 




statistically significant difference (α = .05) between the average wealth of the funds 
with the fewest bankruptcies and the funds with the most.  
 
Table 6 Fund-level wealth and bankruptcy statistics averaged across the 30 markets for the five- 
and ten-fund models. 
	   	  
Model	  
  










Fund	  1	   β0	  =	  5	   4.93	  (0.49)	   0.00	  (0.00)	   13.70	  (1.34)	   0.33	  (0.12)	  
Fund	  2	   β0	  =	  10	   13.51	  (1.61)	   0.13	  (0.08)	   14.08	  (1.14)	   0.37	  (0.11)	  
Fund	  3	   β0	  =	  15	   17.65	  (1.80)	   0.53	  (0.12)	   13.44	  (1.12)	   0.30	  (0.12)	  
Fund	  4	   β0	  =	  20	   21.06	  (1.88)	   1.00	  (0.19)	   13.42	  (1.29)	   0.30	  (0.11)	  
Fund	  5	   β0	  =	  25	   34.00	  (3.32)	   1.27	  (0.24)	   14.55	  (1.26)	   0.23	  (0.09)	  
 
Overall	   18.23	  (0.82)	   2.93	  (0.57)	   13.84	  (0.99)	   1.53	  (0.48)	  
 
















Fund	  1	   β0	  =	  5	   3.57	  (0.42)	   0.00	  (0.00)	   7.53	  (1.00)	   1.17	  (0.33)	  
Fund	  2	   β0	  =	  10	   6.73	  (0.90)	   0.10	  (0.07)	   5.22	  (0.42)	   1.9	  (0.33)	  
Fund	  3	   β0	  =	  15	   6.81	  (0.88)	   0.63	  (0.18)	   6.97	  (0.69)	   1.17	  (0.23)	  
Fund	  4	   β0	  =	  20	   6.42	  (0.67)	   1.03	  (0.21)	   5.95	  (0.76)	   1.23	  (0.27)	  
Fund	  5	   β0	  =	  25	   5.97	  (0.50)	   1.80	  (0.35)	   7.47	  (0.79)	   1.23	  (0.29)	  
Fund	  6	   β0	  =	  30	   7.10	  (0.63)	   2.10	  (0.40)	   6.81	  (0.62)	   1.90	  (0.38)	  
Fund	  7	   β0	  =	  35	   8.12	  (0.50)	   2.50	  (0.45)	   8.18	  (1.03)	   1.23	  (0.38)	  
Fund	  8	   β0	  =	  40	   10.39	  (0.77)	   2.73	  (0.47)	   7.70	  (0.91)	   1.70	  (0.34)	  
Fund	  9	   β0	  =	  45	   13.78	  (1.09)	   2.77	  (0.48)	   10.90	  (1.65)	   1.97	  (0.45)	  
Fund	  10	   β0	  =	  50	   18.12	  (1.67)	   2.80	  (0.48)	   7.36	  (0.88)	   1.20	  (0.28)	  
 
Overall	   8.70	  (0.34)	   16.47	  (2.95)	   7.41	  (0.31)	   14.70	  (2.01)	  
 
Range	   14.55	   2.80	   5.68	   0.80	  
 
NOTE: Bold values are significantly different between base and nested versions at the α = .05 level.  
Base model wealth and bankruptcy values are significantly different between the smallest β0 and 






In both base models there is a strong positive correlation between the number of 
bankruptcies and average wealth achieved by each fund: 0.94 for the five-fund base 
and 0.73 for the ten-fund base model.  That correlation is lost in the nested models, 
dropping to -0.38 for the five-fund model and 0.18 in the ten-fund version.  In the 
nested models, the risk and rewards are more evenly distributed as funds drop their 
fixed distinction by β to compete on improved Sharpe ratio.  
The outer-level funds based their choice on the Sharpe ratio (11) to account 
for the variation across markets demonstrated by such measures as wealth, 
bankruptcy, and returns.  This measure will also highlight the most profitable choice 
given the observed correlation between increased risk and increased profit.  The 
Sharpe ratio is designed to maximize the benefit for a given value of risk. The 
average of the final Sharpe ratios are shown in Table 7 for the base and nested 
versions to compare the risk-weighted profitability.  The nested models had both 
decreased risk and decreased profit across most funds.  Also across most individual 
funds the Sharpe ratio increased.  Those funds that instead showed a significant 
decrease (α = .05) were three of the four funds fixed at the least aggressive β in the 
ten-fund base model and whose incidence of bankruptcy increased in the nested 
version. These are imperfect correlations, however.  Fund 1 of the five-fund model 
was fixed at the least aggressive β in the base model and experienced a significant 
increase (α = .05) in the number of bankruptcies in the 5x5 model, but still increased 
its Sharpe ratio.  By introducing another level of competition, the nested model 
returned more evenly distributed Sharpe ratios across funds just as it had with the 




competitiveness and the positive impact on the Sharpe ratios of most funds provides 
some independent incentive for firms to participate in a contributory data-sharing 
plan that would grant them access to an agent-based model of their market.   
 





Sharpe	  Ratios	   Base	  5	   5x5	   Base	  10	   10x3	  
Fund	  1	   β0	  =	  5	   19.7%	  (0.8%)	   20.1%	  (1.4%)	   17.2%	  (1.2%)	   9.4%	  (1.7%)	  
Fund	  2	   β0	  =	  10	   18.9%	  (1.1%)	   20.2%	  (1.6%)	   16.7%	  (1.3%)	   6.0%	  (1.6%)	  
Fund	  3	   β0	  =	  15	   17.5%	  (1.2%)	   20.8%	  (1.5%)	   14.1%	  (1.8%)	   8.2%	  (1.8%)	  
Fund	  4	   β0	  =	  20	   15.9%	  (1.3%)	   20.7%	  (1.5%)	   12.9%	  (1.8%)	   8.8%	  (1.8%)	  
Fund	  5	   β0	  =	  25	   15.3%	  (1.4%)	   21.7%	  (1.4%)	   10.0%	  (2.1%)	   8.8%	  (1.8%)	  
Fund	  6	   β0	  =	  30	   	  	   	   9.2%	  (2.1%)	   8.9%	  (1.9%)	  
Fund	  7	   β0	  =	  35	   	  	   	   7.6%	  (2.2%)	   11.7%	  (1.8%)	  
Fund	  8	   β0	  =	  40	   	  	   	   7.4%	  (2.2%)	   8.9%	  (1.8%)	  
Fund	  9	   β0	  =	  45	   	  	   	   7.8%	  (2.1%)	   7.8%	  (2.1%)	  
Fund	  10	   β0	  =	  50	   	  	   	   8.1%	  (2.1%)	   9.2%	  (1.8%)	  
	  
Overall	   17.7%	  (1.1%)	   21.2%	  (1.6%)	   10.8%	  (1.9%)	   6.4%	  (1.3%)	  
	  
Range	   4.4%	   1.7%	   9.8%	   5.6%	  
 
NOTE: Bold values are significantly different between the base and nested models at the α = .05 
level.  Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
 
 
The results of the experiment across effective market stability and underlying 
market risk demonstrate moderate improvement over the base model.  Some of the 
weakness of impact was likely from the inability of the endogenously acting agents to 
sufficiently predict their own outcomes from a single trial of each option of the base 
model.  Running more trials per option would mitigate the uncertainty demonstrated 
in the sensitivity analysis.  Even with limited information, individual funds were able 
to use it to their advantage.  While improving the stability of the market, the market 
participants were able to use the new information provided in the proposed structure 




Chapter 5: Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
Some saw the market crash of 2007 as a failure of the market to regulate itself, 
whereas some saw it as a failure of government regulation.  Whether private or 
government control is favored or feasible, greater tools of understanding must be in 
the hands of the market participants and market facilitators, the regulated and the 
regulating.  As discussed, an agent-based model may provide the best solution to the 
problem of measuring outcome paths in the non-linear environment of the financial 
markets.  There would be unprecedented awareness in the market if the OFR could 
compose such a model to be put into the hands of the regulated market participants 
and their regulators.  New avenues for inquiry and stress testing would be available 
for governance.   
 A model of such a scale is not likely to be ready soon, however. Even the 
cryptographic tools necessary for housing and computing the sensitive data that 
would be necessary are still under construction and discussion (Flood, Katz, Ong, & 
Smith, 2013).  Andrew Lo suggested in his 2008 testimony before Congress that we 
allow market participants to calculate their own risk metrics to be delivered to the 
regulating agency to preserve privacy. Yet this practice invites fraud and error. 
Allowing the FSOC to calculate the measure of systemic risk based on submitted data 
instead promotes consistency and would allow the oversight body further calculations 
to provide it with a broader look at the market.  Our proposal relies on such data 





out in their first working paper and most recently developed in their eleventh, there is 
new and developing work in cryptography 
that enable[s] individuals to maintain the privacy of their data through 
encryption algorithms that allow third parties to compute aggregate 
statistics across multiple individuals while preserving the privacy of 
each individual. […] Although still in experimental stages of 
development, these so-called “secure multi-party computational” and 
“fully homomorphic encryption” algorithms will likely revolutionize 
the way in which systemic risk is measured and managed.  
(Bisias et al., 2012) 
 
For the purposes of this proposal, fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) would serve 
to let the participants send encrypted data that would not be decrypted in transmission 
or in computation.  Yet at the same time, this data could serve as useful input to the 
FSOC’s calculations as if it had been unencrypted. The FSOC would need to be able 
to measure the contributors’ impacts on systemic risk as well as the overall network 
effects without seeing the specifics of a company’s data or business processes. Insofar 
as the data is housed, it would need to be maintained with a level of security no less 
than the most secure measures taken by the institutions themselves.  Safeguards 
would need to be taken, but the protection of corporate secrets is already a technology 
in use and could be extended to the government’s access. 
The aim of this thesis has been to begin the investigation into whether such a 
scheme has the potential value to make the effort involved in creating an agent-based 
model of the market worthwhile.  Taking a very simple but validated agent-based 
model of the hedge-fund market as a stand-in for what the OFR might make, we 
developed a nested agent-based model of our proposal in which the hedge-fund 




market informed by an agent-based model of itself is more stable, and whether any 
loss in profit would be offset by the potential for greater stability. 
Market stability was most significantly improved in the decline in 
bankruptcies and leverage build-up in the five-fund model.  While other metrics were 
more muted or unchanged, by no measure was the more informed market less stable 
overall than the model of uninformed agents.  Bankruptcy declines came with wealth 
declines as well, but by factoring in the improved risk profile to the portrait of profit, 
we find that most funds able to run a forecasting ABM had a Sharpe ratio better than 
in the base model.  This increase in market stability and return given the risk was 
particularly notable for having been generated by a very dynamic market of agents 
using a parameter-static market of agents as their forecasting tool.  
We would recommend an inquiry into what would happen if we replaced the 
parameter-static agent-based model the outer-level funds are using as a forecasting 
tool with some other known forecasting methods currently in use.  The agent-based 
model run in the experiment of this thesis was allowed to use recent information from 
the other funds on the assumption that the market regulator would be the model 
facilitator, maintaining the fund-level data in a secure and encrypted format.  A non-
agent based model used for forecasting instead would be more linear than an ABM 
and would only have available the data from each fund’s own history and general 
market information.  Nonetheless, funds in the present real markets use many 
forecasting methods of such linear and information-limited scope to great advantage.  




level with the results of this first experiment would better inform the value of the 
ABM as a strategic market tool.  
This thesis invites and supports such further inquiry into the use of agent-
based models as excellent non-linear financial modeling tools.  To obtain the 
necessary expertise, data, and participation for the development and use of such a 
model, we recommend companion modeling between the OFR and financial firms to 
generate a government-facilitated agent-based model with secured contributed 
proprietary information.  This government-maintained model would help the market 
participants see themselves as endogenous to the market while providing transparency 
to the regulator, opening the door for greater regulation of the markets both by the 









Base Model Time Step Walk-Through 
 
The initialized parameters in the bottom right of Figures 2 and 7 are fixed at 
the beginning of each program.  The only value generated independently of the others 
in every time step is the noise expenditure. All other values are generated by finding 
the market-clearing price.  This price feeds directly into all other equations that are 
connected sequentially from the returns generated in the last round to the return’s 
implications for the demand generated in the current round.  This demand feeds back 








In Figures 2 and 7, blue numbers are used to represent inputs generated 
elsewhere in the flow, orange numbers are generated and used within the same group 
of equations, and red numbers are the outputs from each equation set that serve as one 
of the following equation set’s inputs.  Black numbers are fixed inputs, either from 
the fixed parameters set at the beginning of the program or from values generated in 
the prior time step.   
The numbers for the example in Figure 7 were generated on a 3-fund market.  
While the diagram depicts the flow for fund 1, there are two other funds dependent on 
and influencing the market-clearing price.  All three funds are represented in the 
market-clearing equation by the contribution of their demands.  The demand for fund 
1 is the blue 0.275 summed together with the demands of funds 2 and 3 in the price 
block. These contribute to the red 0.973, which is the numerical solution to the 
simultaneous equation problem – the market-clearing price. The market-clearing price 
equation in a 3-fund market is the intersection of three otherwise independent flow 
sequences for each fund, visually depicted in Figure 8.  
 
Figure 8 Hedge Fund Time Step Flows 







10x3 Model Aggressiveness 
 
The aggressiveness in the 10-fund nested model was allowed to grow without 
bound as funds chose to add 5, 0, or -5 to their parameter β.  Though the average 
market aggressiveness showed dramatic shifts, this did not seem to have any direct 
impact on the other variables under observation. A graph showing a comparison of 
the wealth of funds in one ten-fund market along with the average β is shown in 




Figure 9 Nested Ten Fund Aggressiveness vs. Wealth 
The wealth of five funds of the ten-fund nested model plotted along with the 
average market aggressiveness shows no signs of being impacted by the 





Figure 10 Nested Five Fund Aggressiveness vs. Wealth 
The wealth of all funds in the five-fund nested model plotted along with the 
average market aggressiveness shows no signs of being impacted by the 




Though the rest of the output data from the 10x3 model is in line with 
expectation, the unbounded growth of the 10x3 model β’s does not line up with the 
understanding of the variable.  If a normally diverse market contained funds with 
appetites ranging from a conservative 5 to an aggressive fund 50, what would market 
aggressiveness be when over 100? The aggressiveness represents the fund’s demand 
for underpriced assets – the demand and price they are willing to pay.  With numbers 
that far exceed the initial parameters, these values become meaningless. On the other 
hand, the aggressiveness parameter for the 5x5 model is a class variable, taking 
values from conservative to aggressive but not beyond that in either direction.  This 







capital: cash-equivalent used to buy assets.  If a firm is borrowing, the capital is used 
as collateral against the loan.   
 
credit-default swap: an insurance policy against the default on credit (failure to pay 
debt) of a third party. The purchaser pays the seller for the guaranty of debt 
payment if the third party defaults on the loan. 
 
default: failure to make payment on a loan 
 
derivative: a type of financial instrument whose value is derived by algorithm or 
schedule from an underlying entity or asset 
 
dividend: payment made as a distribution of profits to shareholders 
 
emergent: developing, or generated by a collective process 
 
externality: an impact from an activity on a third party who did not choose the 
activity or its effects 
 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation: a United States government coporation 
created by the Banking Act of 1933 to guaranty deposits at participating banks 
 
Federal Reserve: the central bank of the United States, created by the Federal 
Reserve Act in 1913 to maximize employment, stabilize prices, and moderate 
interest rates 
 
financial instrument: any tradeable asset 
 
fully homomorphic encryption: a cryptographic system which supports addition and 
multiplication on encrypted inputs and returns encrypted outputs. 
 
government sponsored enterprise: financial services corporations created by the 
government to enhance credit for borrowers and increase market strength by 
reducing risk to investors 
 
hedge fund: initially designed to hedge or limit the risk to a portfolio of a market 
crash, hedge funds are aggressively managed investment portfolios limited to 
accredited investors 
 
hedge: an investment position reducing the risk of an asset by taking an offsetting 





leverage: debt used to finance asset purchases 
 
liquidity: the degree to which an asset can be bought or sold in the market without 
affecting the asset's price.  Liquidity is characterized by a high level of trading 
activity.  Assets that can be easily bought or sold are known as liquid assets. 
 
long position: buying an asset when it is perceived to be undervalued, with the 
expectation that it will rise in value 
 
margin call: a demand by a lender that an investor deposit further collateral to cover 
possible losses 
 
market-clearing: equality of supply and demand.  A market-clearing price is thus 
one at which there is the same amount of demand for an asset as there is supply. 
 
MATLAB: computer program for numerical computing developed by MathWorks.  
Specially suited to working with matrices.  
 
mortgage-backed securities: a type of asset-backed security that is secured by a pool 
of mortgages 
 
noise traders: investors whose decisions are not based on the fundamentals of the 
stock's value, even if some other technical analysis is involved   
 
optionality: having an embedded financial option, such as the right to repay before 
the end of the loan term 
 
over-the-counter: negotiated privately rather than on a regulated exchange with 
standardized terms 
 
risk profile: the threats to which an entity is exposed as well as the entity's appetite 
for and management of those risks 
 
SAS: statistical analytics software developed by SAS Institute.  Specially suited to 
processing large data line by line. 
 
scripts: self-contained MATLAB programs which require no input to run 
 
security: a negotiable financial instrument representing value dependent on some 
asset, then said to be 'secured'  
 
short: selling a borrowed security into the market with the promise to purchase from 
the market to repay the debt in the future.  Usually performed when the seller 
expects the price to decline. 
 





stress-test: a simulation performed on a portfolio to determine financial solvency in 
the event of a crisis 
 
utility: an economic term referring to total benefit gained from a certain good or 
service 
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